| Understanding the New Imperialism | ||
 | ||
| Interview with David Harvey by Harry Kreisler of the Institute of International Studies, UC Berkely. David Harvey is the author of The New Imperialism (OUP) and The Limits to Capital (Verso) | ||
Your new book is The New Imperialism, and it seems to follow logically from your career. I'm sure this is problem that you thouht about over time, although this is your first book on the topic, and it obviously relates to what is going on in the world today. What is new about the new imperialism? That was one of the questions that I wanted to address. I'm not sure I found the complete solution to it; I identified some things. One of the things I would point out here is that for a long time I've been talking about the special or geographical dynamics of capital accumulation, and what I call uneven geographical development, how these molecular processes of capital flow, moving from one part of the country to another, build new spaces and geographical concentrations even within countries. When you look at the United States you see that fifty years ago, the Northeast and the Midwest were the center of everything. And then something happened; the capitalist flow went to the South and the West, and the changing dynamics of political power come out of that. I've always been interested in these geographical processes whereby capital is creating landscapes, sometimes knocking down landscapes and building new landscapes. This leads in many instances to issues of domination. In the nineteenth century, it was Boston capital that dominated a lot of things, New York capital, and Chicago capital. So internally there's often relations of domination. When it came to think about imperialism, in general, I wanted to locate the notion of imperialism against the background of those kinds of processes, of production of space by capital accumulation. That's what I wanted to do. Explain to us for a wider audience what you mean by capitalist accumulation. Give us a way of understand that. A capitalist has money, puts it into circulation, and comes out with more money at the end. That more money is an accumulation of capital. Then the question arises: what do they do with that more money that comes out at the end? In many instances, they plow it back in to make even more money. So there is a logical process of capital accumulation. Sometimes they make by money by other means -- by takeovers and all sorts of [other] strategies. The dynamic of our society, a capitalist society, is powered by the push always to accumulate capital, to make a profit. Profit means the system has to expand, because there has to be more at the end of the year than there was at the beginning. So we end up with the notion that, for example, growth is a significant indicator of the health of the system. A capitalist system must grow or bust, and it is that growth which I am talking about. Capital accumulation is the growth of capital. You say in your book that it's important to distinguish between territorial and capitalist logics of power. You've just talked about that -- the interface, the synthesis, the interaction between a logic that expands the space on the one hand; and on the other, the need of capitalism to find new places to make profit. I look at this not simply at the nation state level, but at the area of, say, a mayor of a city like Baltimore. Deindustrialization is going on. Capital is moving out. So what does the mayor do in charge of this territory? "Okay, that's okay"? Or do they say, "We have to find new ways to bring new capital in"? The territorial logic is about trying to maintain the health and well-being of a particular space in the face of this capillary movement of capital moving left, right, and center, and everywhere. If the steel industry is collapsing and the shipbuilding is collapsing, what does somebody who is in charge of the territorial logic do? You say, "Well, maybe it's convention centers and the convention business. Maybe it's museums. Maybe it's tourism, or something of that kind." So the territorial logic is very much about trying to maintain the health and well-being of a particular place and space within this notion, which is very hard for anybody to control because capitalists decide they're going to take their money from here and put it there. You can't really stop them unless you've got strong regulatory controls, which by and large have disappeared, of course. You have another concept which I want you to explain to us, which is central to your argument, and it's the distinction between accumulation by expanded reproduction and that by primitive accumulation. Or what you call accumulation by dispossession. Help us understand those terms. Accumulation by dispossession is about dispossessing somebody of their assets or their rights. Traditionally there have been rights which have common property, and one of the ways in which you take these away is by privatizing them. We've seen moves in recent years to privatize water. Traditionally, everybody had had access to water, and [when] it gets privatized, you have to pay for it. We've seen the privatization of a lot of education by the defunding of the public sector, and so more and more people have to turn to the private sector. We've seen the same thing in health care. What we're talking about here is the taking away of universal rights, and the privatization of them, so it [becomes] your particular responsibility, rather than the responsibility of the state. One of the proposals which we now have is the privatization of Social Security. Social Security may not be that generous, but it's universal and everybody has part of it. What we are now saying is, "That shouldn't be; it should be privatized," which, of course, means that people will then have to invest in their own pension funds, which means more money goes to Wall Street. So this is what I call privatization by dispossession in our particular circumstance. A lot of other things are going on. For instance, look at the way in which lands have been taken away; peasant movements have been destroyed by state action. There are a lot of things of that sort happening around the world, where people are accumulating at other people's expense. A good example of this would be the oil companies in places like Nigeria, for example, where the company comes in and displaces land and creates conditions that destroy a way of life. Yes, that's right. Look at the way in which U.S.-subsidized agriculture is destroying rural life in Mexico since the Mexican [government] took away all the protections of collective ownership in peasant societies and privatized the land. Here you have another situation where a way of life is destroyed by a particular kind of economic and political process. When we're talking about empire or imperialism today, we're talking about the United States. How should we understand the particular evolution of capitalism in the United States and the processes at work as our global role has taken a new form? You spoke yesterday When we're talking about empire or imperialism today, we're talking about the in our lecture of the financialization of American capital. The switch into financial domination of the world which occurred in the 1970s was a specific move taken within the United States to enhance finance capitalism against manufacturing and productive capitalism. Manufacturing and productive capitalism has largely been pushed out of the United States; not entirely, obviously, but much of it has moved to East and Southeast Asia, and, of course, quite a bit is in Europe as well. The United States is no longer a dominant player in the world of production. But the U.S. took the view that that didn't matter, provided it always had the financial power. It used the financial [power] to its advantage during the 1980s and 1990s, in particular, and assembled a great deal of wealth out of this particular financialization strategy. What we now see is that's coming to an end. The internal budget deficit of the United States, the current account deficit of the United States, is making the U.S. into a chronic debtor country, and if you're a debtor country you're vulnerable to those who hold your debt. This is a real threat to America hegemony, American domination. How, then, in this situation of vulnerability do we account for the new emphasis on territoriality? The neoconservatives are leading the show right now, or appearing to lead the show, driven by what you would call the territorial logic. As leaders of the state, they are in a different situation than the mayor of Baltimore. What are those differences and why their new-found importance? Is it a weakness that you just talked about? This is the big mystery, the question, and I think we can only make informed guesses about it. My informed guess is that, first off, this switch in the way in which the U.S. is approaching the world into a much more territorial vision by the occupation of Iraq is a great departure in U.S. political history. It's a new kind of imperialist practice which the U.S. has not followed for a hundred years or so. It takes us back to the McKinley period and what happened at the end of the nineteenth century. So the big question is why that switch into a territorial mode, and also, why this switch into militarization? [It is] not exactly an entirely new thing, because U.S. military power has always been a significant aspect of U.S. imperialist practices, but to make it explicit in this way [is new]. This is rather different from what could be seen as a defensive war in Vietnam to an offensive, preemptive war to try to establish a territorial configuration, which is new in global politics. This is something which is distinctively new. My feeling about it is that the neoconservative vision which is driving this is very, very much concerned about maintaining authority and maintaining order, and it hasn't got the leverage it once had through financial mechanisms or through productive capacity, or even through cultural persuasion that it once had. The only leverage it's got left is indeed the military one, and the military one, of course, is not very good at fighting diffuse forces. The military one has always been about territorial logic. So a return to militarization brings you back into territorial aggrandizement. I don't think this is consistent with U.S. imperialist practices, and I'm not sure it's going to last. It may, in fact, be something that they try, and then it's going to be found wanting. You emphasize also the importance of the dynamic between the inner logic and the external logic. That also relates to what you're saying here. The internal situation in the United States has a very important role to play in how things happen on the outside. And, conversely, what happens on the outside feeds back into the United States. I'm very, very concerned right now about this, the famous statement that Hannah Arendt made, which is that empire abroad means tyranny at home. We're seeing a militarization of action abroad, but we're also seeing an attempt to militarize U.S. society at home. It was a wonderful moment when Bush was introducing Attorney General Ashcroft, and he said, "He's a general. I wonder why we call him a general? Well, I guess it's because we're all in the military now." This attitude, the militarization of U.S. political life, is a very scary aspect. Of course, the war on terror and fear of terror become part of the ways in which you justify that militarization both abroad and at home. So I'm rather nervous about how that fear is being used for a particular political end to try to establish order and authority both at home and abroad. I'm curious what your thoughts are about the role of technology in all of this. As you pointed out, the country has failed, in some ways, in integrating technology into production that's actually located here; but in terms of integrating technology into the military, it provides a vehicle to be a global policeman in a new effective way in military terms, not necessarily in political. Comment on that, if you see that connection. Two things: one area in which the U.S. still does have a lot of dominance is technological innovation. A lot of that does connect to the military aspect of things. About 50 percent of the world's R&D is done inside the United States. The United States is still the center of technological innovation. The big problem is it doesn't use that technological innovation internally; a lot of it goes abroad. The Japanese and the Chinese and people in Singapore are very adept at taking U.S. technologies, paying royalties for it, but then using them for their own specific production systems, so that that technological advantage doesn't necessarily remain within the United States, except through the flow of rent sent to the United States, paying for licensing fees and so on. On the military side, we see a real problem. What we see is that technologically, the U.S. can dominate almost anything now from 30,000 feet up. But if you are into occupying a place like Iraq on the ground, dominating the world from 30,000 feet up with high technology is just not going to work. You need massive ground forces. Already, the United States is running out of forces to keep on the ground. It's trying to construct, in effect, a mercenary force by paying for Polish troops to be there, paying for twenty people to be there from Lithuania, or Estonia, or wherever. It's trying to construct almost a mercenary army because it doesn't have, as it were, the military power on the ground. What we're seeing is an overstretching of military manpower right now, which is a crucial problem that can't be resolved by this tremendous emphasis upon technological advantage. You've discussed or hinted at the limits to the new imperialism in the United States: an anti-colonial tradition on the one hand, and the sorry state of American capitalism that moves to financialization. I would like to ask you about the oppositional element. As a Marxist, you are sensitive to the oppositional forces arising in a particular place as a result of the disenfranchisement from the processes afoot. What do you see as the basis for a politics grounded in true opposition to American imperialism? There are several ways in which you can configure the opposition, and these aren't necessarily the ones that I would favor. There's a lot of nationalist opposition around the world to U.S. global domination, and some of that is beginning to provoke certain alliances amongst forces which are very resistant to what the U.S. is up to around the world. You can see this increasingly with alliances like the one that is emerging between Brazil and India and China and Russia, which is becoming quite nationalistic as well. So what we're seeing is a zone of resistance to what the U.S. is trying to do globally, which I don't think is progressive at all. I think in many ways it's regressive and I think it's dangerous. But nevertheless, it is a very strong force of opposition. An alliance between, say, Russian, China, India, and Brazil against the United States, or against Europe, seems to me to be quite a fierce global battle which I would not like to see unfold, but I think it's there. What worries me right now is that there's not a very coherent general opposition with a very good plan against what's happening both globally and locally. For example, I'm absolutely amazed that there is a great deal of discontent in this country over things like education, health care, public services, failing infrastructure, and yet there is no political movement which is articulating those ideas and saying that these have to be part of a new progressive politics in this country, and that anybody who comes to power must address those issues. I see the Democrats beginning to address those issues, not because they want to but because the base is forcing them. But I don't think they're speaking to the anger that exists amongst large groups in the population over what is happening to them in terms of their life -- having health care problems and insurance problems, and the lack of resources in the midst of tremendous wealth that is being accumulated by this plutocracy, the upper classes. What explanations can you offer for that? Is it the failure of the media? Is it some element in post-modernity where people aren't able to make the connections that are necessary to move toward political action? It's all of the above. It's a configuration of things that come together. The emphasis on special issues -- on, for instance, gay rights, women's movement, all those things which I think are very important and I would support them -- but if those are the only questions, then immediately it becomes hugely fragmentary. It would be appalling, for example, if the next election was decided mainly on the issue of do you or do you not support gay marriage. Nevertheless, you could see how those issues get used as part of the political means to remain in power. So I'm very concerned about that. Then, of course, there is the media. The debasement of public discourse is very distressing to me. Even the responsible media now won't handle difficult questions in a responsible way. Much of what's happened is the whole world has been reduced into an O'Reilly shouting at Al Franken, or an Al Franken shouting back at O'Reilly. There seems to be absolutely no way in which we can sit down and have a sensible discussion about which way we should go and how we should go. As soon as you try to have a sensible discussion, it gets thrown into this maelstrom where it turns into a shouting match of slacking off each other. The media is complicit in that a lot of the time, because it's a spectacle. It's a reduction of public discourse to the spectacle of gladiatorial nonsense in the studio. It's also the fact that there's been no institutional form. It's a failure of the party system in this country, and the fact that both parties are so beholden to big capital for their money that neither of them are going to take on a class issue, and say, "Yes, this is class war. Yes, this is a class issue. And, yes, we have to confront this as a class issue across race lines, across gender lines, across sexual orientation lines." This is a class issue, and we've got to get a class politics back into the country somehow. I would like you to comment on the role of the Blair government and your country of origin with regard to the new imperialism, because Blair's Labour government became an instrument to further U.S. goals. How do you account for that, and what does it mean? It has a long history. It goes back to Suez in 1956, when the British went on their own, and the U.S. rapped them over the knuckles and said, "Get out of there. Get out of Egypt." After that, the British tied themselves very much to U.S. foreign policy, and they've been very reluctant ever to go against U.S. foreign policy. So there's been that longstanding tie. In addition, remember, the British and the Americans were patrolling Iraq in the air jointly during the 1990s, and maintaining the free-fly zone. So Britain was heavily involved in Iraq all the way through the Clinton years. When Bush came to power and took this position, the British had a difficult choice. You see, it's one thing for France to say they won't join in an action; it would be very difficult for Britain to say, "We are going to get out of an action." The British knew, also, that Bush is a very vindictive politician: if you desert him, you're in trouble. The U.S. could have created real trouble for the British, particularly in Northern Ireland, interestingly. One of the reasons why Aznar in Spain went in and joined this whole thing had to do with getting ETA declared as a terrorist organization by the United States. So the United States is in a position to create trouble for those governments in some way, and Britain didn't want that. I found it fascinating when he gave a talk in Congress, he insisted that we not talk about American values, we talk about universal values, and we talk about them in way which doesn't privilege. Blair, I think, has been trying to set up a more cosmopolitan imperialism, as opposed to the almost nationalist imperialism that you're getting in the United States formulated by the Bush administration that says American values are supreme values -- everybody in the world wants to be an American, everybody believes that we are the beacon of freedom, and all of that. Blair was saying, "No, that's not the case." I think that Blair had a view that somehow or other he could pull Bush into a different kind of imperialist practice that would be a little less nationalistic and more universal. We saw this in the fact that Blair was the one who pushed Bush into even setting up something like the "roadmap" in the Middle East for the Palestinian-Israelis. I don't think the Bush administration would have done it on its own. It did it because Britain was pushing them and they had to do something along those lines. The British situation in relationship to this has to be understood in those terms. I guess also he sees Britain as a mediator with Europe, in a way. Well, yes, he maybe thinks that, but, of course, he's not going to do that if it makes Britain more antagonistic to Europe. But recently he's been trying to win back a little bit of a position in Europe, because he realizes that he got isolated in the European context. |
Wednesday, April 1, 2009
Understanding the New Imperialism
Monday, March 30, 2009
新自由主義——失靈的藥方
http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.com/theory/2009-02/09/content_10784992.htm
失靈的藥方——看西方學者如何批評新自由主義
◎ 丁 冰
新自由主義是承襲新古典經濟學自由思想並作為凱恩斯國家干預主義的對立物而產生的保守主義經濟思潮。1979年以後，新自由主義在美國和英國得到積極倡導和推行，並氾濫于全世界；到1990年更發展成為“華盛頓共識”。這一“共識”共有10條政策要求，其中雖然有如加強財經紀律、壓縮財政赤字、降低通貨膨脹等具有一定合理性，但從整體來看，其核心是要實行全盤私有化、市場化和自由化，實質上不過是以美國為首的資本主義發達國家向發展中國家推行新殖民主義的思想武器。新自由主義的理論和政策，不僅遭到馬克思主義、社會主義者的反對，而且許多西方學者也不斷對其進行批評，本文擬對西方學者對新自由主義的質疑和批評作一簡要述評。
一、對私有化“神話”的質疑和批評
私有化是新自由主義最基本的前提和基礎。新自由主義的領軍人物弗裏德曼認為，每個人或每個家庭所要追求的自由，最重要的是經濟自由，但是，實現經濟自由的前提必須“企業是私有的。”以科斯為代表的新制度經濟學派還把產權理論和經濟效率聯繫起來，認為企業實現效益最大化的前提必須是產權有明確而合理的界定，即要求產權清晰。英國經濟學家施米德說得很清楚：“科斯的分析指出，公有財產必須取消，選擇制度的規律因之而成為：一切財產應該屬於私人和個人”。在新自由主義者看來，企業私有乃是實現個人自由、經濟自由和提高經濟效率的基本前提和基礎，甚至把私有化吹捧到神乎其神的地步。然而實踐證明，私有制雖然在一定的歷史階段和條件下有進步的積極作用，但也不能絕對化。
美國著名經濟學家、諾貝爾經濟學獎獲得者約瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨就曾對私有產權神話的觀點提出了嚴厲批評，認為私有產權神話會誤導社會主義國家把注意力集中在對產權進行私有化改革上。他說：“這種神話是一種危險的神話，因為它誤導了許多轉型國家把注意力集中在產權問題上，即集中在私有化上。”
2007年1月，美國著名金融家邁克爾·赫德森撰文《私有化的神話和現實》，更對新自由主義者所鼓吹的私有化的本質及其所謂“優越性”作了較深刻的揭露和批評。
赫德森認為，上世紀80年代以後，私有化的呼聲愈益高漲，與“冷戰”中西方發達國家企圖削弱、摧毀俄羅斯的工業和軍事力量有關。他說：“作為一項國際政策，私有化主要是由美國政府的戰略家推動的，目的是要瓦解俄羅斯的工業力量——並以此消除潛在的軍事競爭對手。作為華盛頓共識的主要內容，私有化成為冷戰的終結者。”作者在這裡不僅認為美國鼓吹和推動私有化的目的在於削弱和摧毀蘇聯的軍事力量，而且把私有化政策的成功視為“冷戰”結束的標誌。
然而，新自由主義者，特別是新制度經濟學派以科斯產權理論為依據，硬說實行產權私有是為了提高經濟效率，促進經濟增長。對此，赫德森又以事實為依據，指出所謂私有化能夠提高效率，不過是為達到不可告人的目的的一種藉口或“神話”。
在宏觀經濟層面上，赫德森提出，新自由主義經濟學家們談的“私有化在本質上比公共運營和公共所有權更有效率”的觀點缺乏依據。赫德森還從收入分配的角度揭穿了私有化能使人們普遍受益的謊言。他說，私有化由於“通過使財富所有權兩極分化以致鼓勵尋租，……它也增強了既得利益集團的力量，後者把經濟力量轉化成政治杠桿，從而以有利於他們自己的方式修改稅法和其他公共政策”。意即私有化只有利於少數資本家和既得利益集團，根本談不上“能惠及所有人”。 赫德森指出這點是完全正確的，只是受階級的局限，還沒有進一步指出，在資本主義私有制和雇傭勞動制下，由於全部剩餘價值被資本家所無償佔有，收入分配只能是兩極分化，而不能惠及所有人。
赫德森在同一篇文章中還對其他種種美化私有化的謬論作了批評，這裡就不一一贅述。他的觀點在西方經濟學中雖然不佔統治地位，但也有一定的代表性，因而值得注意。
二、對市場萬能論的否定
市場萬能論（有的又稱“市場原教旨主義”）是新自由主義的重要內容。新古典經濟學家把亞當·斯密“一隻看不見的手”的市場機制理論推向極端，認為市場是萬能的，只要依靠市場的自由交易，社會經濟就能自動實現充分就業均衡。到上世紀30年代，凱恩斯在經濟大危機的背景下提出了嶄新的宏觀經濟理論體系和國家干預經濟的政策主張，從而在西方經濟學中第一次對“市場萬能論”作了全面否定。到70 年代，隨著凱恩斯主義“失靈”，弗裏德曼又在自己現代貨幣數量論的基礎上重新肯定市場萬能論的觀點，主張實行只關注貨幣供應量的“單一規則”，讓市場機制去調節一切社會資源的配置問題，即不論是私人產品還是公共產品都要讓市場機制去調節和安排，反對國家干預。從而主張政府職能最小化，認為政府的基本作用是充當市場的“裁判員”。 這就是所謂“市場化”或“市場萬能論”。可見“市場化”與“市場機制”是有區別的，前者是把後者推向極端的一種通常的說法。
弗裏德曼的市場萬能論建立在他的新自由主義先驅馮·哈耶克個人自由至上的思想基礎之上。他認為，只要按自由市場機制辦事，一切社會經濟問題和個人自由問題都可有序地迎刃而解。然而事實是產品的市場交換在表面自由平等的背後卻掩蓋著極不公平的事實，以致會引發種種社會問題，直至暴力，人們所追求的個人自由也只能化為泡影。許多西方學者特別是左翼學者對此也看得非常清楚。如美共經濟委員會成員瓦迪·哈拉比（Wadi Halabi）2007年12月23日在美共《人民週刊》發表文章說：“弗裏德曼稱讚‘自由市場’，卻對維持市場極不平等的交換必然需要大規模使用暴力——軍隊、警察、監獄視而不見。皮諾切特統治下的智利就是一個赤裸裸的案例。”可見，自由市場化政策也並不是像其倡導者所想像的那樣可以實現個人自由的目的。當然市場機制在一定範圍內對配置社會資源有其不可替代的積極作用，因此，人們在經濟建設中，充分發揮市場機制的積極作用是合理的、必要的，但若把它誇大到“萬能”的地步就有失偏頗了。
值得注意的是，對市場萬能論持否定態度的，在西方國家中不僅是左翼學者，有的右翼金融家在事實面前也是如此。例如，美國著名的國際金融家索羅斯在談到當前美國金融危機的原因時說：“眼下發生的事情令人難以置信！這是我所說的市場原教旨主義這一放任市場和讓其自動調節理論作用的結果。危機並非因為一些外來因素，也不是自然災害造成的，是體制給自己造成了損失。它發生了內破裂。” 應當說，索羅斯的這個說法是有相當見地的。
◎ 丁 冰
新自由主義是承襲新古典經濟學自由思想並作為凱恩斯國家干預主義的對立物而產生的保守主義經濟思潮。1979年以後，新自由主義在美國和英國得到積極倡導和推行，並氾濫于全世界；到1990年更發展成為“華盛頓共識”。這一“共識”共有10條政策要求，其中雖然有如加強財經紀律、壓縮財政赤字、降低通貨膨脹等具有一定合理性，但從整體來看，其核心是要實行全盤私有化、市場化和自由化，實質上不過是以美國為首的資本主義發達國家向發展中國家推行新殖民主義的思想武器。新自由主義的理論和政策，不僅遭到馬克思主義、社會主義者的反對，而且許多西方學者也不斷對其進行批評，本文擬對西方學者對新自由主義的質疑和批評作一簡要述評。
一、對私有化“神話”的質疑和批評
私有化是新自由主義最基本的前提和基礎。新自由主義的領軍人物弗裏德曼認為，每個人或每個家庭所要追求的自由，最重要的是經濟自由，但是，實現經濟自由的前提必須“企業是私有的。”以科斯為代表的新制度經濟學派還把產權理論和經濟效率聯繫起來，認為企業實現效益最大化的前提必須是產權有明確而合理的界定，即要求產權清晰。英國經濟學家施米德說得很清楚：“科斯的分析指出，公有財產必須取消，選擇制度的規律因之而成為：一切財產應該屬於私人和個人”。在新自由主義者看來，企業私有乃是實現個人自由、經濟自由和提高經濟效率的基本前提和基礎，甚至把私有化吹捧到神乎其神的地步。然而實踐證明，私有制雖然在一定的歷史階段和條件下有進步的積極作用，但也不能絕對化。
美國著名經濟學家、諾貝爾經濟學獎獲得者約瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨就曾對私有產權神話的觀點提出了嚴厲批評，認為私有產權神話會誤導社會主義國家把注意力集中在對產權進行私有化改革上。他說：“這種神話是一種危險的神話，因為它誤導了許多轉型國家把注意力集中在產權問題上，即集中在私有化上。”
2007年1月，美國著名金融家邁克爾·赫德森撰文《私有化的神話和現實》，更對新自由主義者所鼓吹的私有化的本質及其所謂“優越性”作了較深刻的揭露和批評。
赫德森認為，上世紀80年代以後，私有化的呼聲愈益高漲，與“冷戰”中西方發達國家企圖削弱、摧毀俄羅斯的工業和軍事力量有關。他說：“作為一項國際政策，私有化主要是由美國政府的戰略家推動的，目的是要瓦解俄羅斯的工業力量——並以此消除潛在的軍事競爭對手。作為華盛頓共識的主要內容，私有化成為冷戰的終結者。”作者在這裡不僅認為美國鼓吹和推動私有化的目的在於削弱和摧毀蘇聯的軍事力量，而且把私有化政策的成功視為“冷戰”結束的標誌。
然而，新自由主義者，特別是新制度經濟學派以科斯產權理論為依據，硬說實行產權私有是為了提高經濟效率，促進經濟增長。對此，赫德森又以事實為依據，指出所謂私有化能夠提高效率，不過是為達到不可告人的目的的一種藉口或“神話”。
在宏觀經濟層面上，赫德森提出，新自由主義經濟學家們談的“私有化在本質上比公共運營和公共所有權更有效率”的觀點缺乏依據。赫德森還從收入分配的角度揭穿了私有化能使人們普遍受益的謊言。他說，私有化由於“通過使財富所有權兩極分化以致鼓勵尋租，……它也增強了既得利益集團的力量，後者把經濟力量轉化成政治杠桿，從而以有利於他們自己的方式修改稅法和其他公共政策”。意即私有化只有利於少數資本家和既得利益集團，根本談不上“能惠及所有人”。 赫德森指出這點是完全正確的，只是受階級的局限，還沒有進一步指出，在資本主義私有制和雇傭勞動制下，由於全部剩餘價值被資本家所無償佔有，收入分配只能是兩極分化，而不能惠及所有人。
赫德森在同一篇文章中還對其他種種美化私有化的謬論作了批評，這裡就不一一贅述。他的觀點在西方經濟學中雖然不佔統治地位，但也有一定的代表性，因而值得注意。
二、對市場萬能論的否定
市場萬能論（有的又稱“市場原教旨主義”）是新自由主義的重要內容。新古典經濟學家把亞當·斯密“一隻看不見的手”的市場機制理論推向極端，認為市場是萬能的，只要依靠市場的自由交易，社會經濟就能自動實現充分就業均衡。到上世紀30年代，凱恩斯在經濟大危機的背景下提出了嶄新的宏觀經濟理論體系和國家干預經濟的政策主張，從而在西方經濟學中第一次對“市場萬能論”作了全面否定。到70 年代，隨著凱恩斯主義“失靈”，弗裏德曼又在自己現代貨幣數量論的基礎上重新肯定市場萬能論的觀點，主張實行只關注貨幣供應量的“單一規則”，讓市場機制去調節一切社會資源的配置問題，即不論是私人產品還是公共產品都要讓市場機制去調節和安排，反對國家干預。從而主張政府職能最小化，認為政府的基本作用是充當市場的“裁判員”。 這就是所謂“市場化”或“市場萬能論”。可見“市場化”與“市場機制”是有區別的，前者是把後者推向極端的一種通常的說法。
弗裏德曼的市場萬能論建立在他的新自由主義先驅馮·哈耶克個人自由至上的思想基礎之上。他認為，只要按自由市場機制辦事，一切社會經濟問題和個人自由問題都可有序地迎刃而解。然而事實是產品的市場交換在表面自由平等的背後卻掩蓋著極不公平的事實，以致會引發種種社會問題，直至暴力，人們所追求的個人自由也只能化為泡影。許多西方學者特別是左翼學者對此也看得非常清楚。如美共經濟委員會成員瓦迪·哈拉比（Wadi Halabi）2007年12月23日在美共《人民週刊》發表文章說：“弗裏德曼稱讚‘自由市場’，卻對維持市場極不平等的交換必然需要大規模使用暴力——軍隊、警察、監獄視而不見。皮諾切特統治下的智利就是一個赤裸裸的案例。”可見，自由市場化政策也並不是像其倡導者所想像的那樣可以實現個人自由的目的。當然市場機制在一定範圍內對配置社會資源有其不可替代的積極作用，因此，人們在經濟建設中，充分發揮市場機制的積極作用是合理的、必要的，但若把它誇大到“萬能”的地步就有失偏頗了。
值得注意的是，對市場萬能論持否定態度的，在西方國家中不僅是左翼學者，有的右翼金融家在事實面前也是如此。例如，美國著名的國際金融家索羅斯在談到當前美國金融危機的原因時說：“眼下發生的事情令人難以置信！這是我所說的市場原教旨主義這一放任市場和讓其自動調節理論作用的結果。危機並非因為一些外來因素，也不是自然災害造成的，是體制給自己造成了損失。它發生了內破裂。” 應當說，索羅斯的這個說法是有相當見地的。
三、對自由化實質及其後果的揭露和批評
這裡說的自由化主要是指“華盛頓共識”所強調的國際金融自由化、貿易自由化、投資自由化。
上世紀70年代以後，在新自由主義氾濫的大潮下，金融自由化表現特別突出，掀起一股強勁的金融創新浪潮，原來的金融管制被逐漸淡化。由於放鬆金融監管，金融衍生品愈來愈多，形式愈來愈複雜，最終導致從2007年8月開始的以“次貸”危機為導火線的世界性金融海嘯和經濟衰退的產生。可見，金融自由化所帶來的後果是嚴重的，美國前聯儲主席格林斯潘2008年10月23日在國會作證時也公開承認，自己掌管美聯儲期間曾疏于對金融業的監管，助長金融自由化發展是一個“錯誤”。2008年諾貝爾經濟學獎得主保羅·克魯格曼還指出，美國當前這次危機是整個近30年來世界經濟危機的一個延續。他說：“墨西哥、巴西、阿根廷、泰國、印度尼西亞都已經歷過了，現在是美國”。意即近30年來，無論是拉美各國的金融危機、東南亞各國的金融危機，還是當前美國的金融危機（現實際已發展為世界性的金融危機和經濟衰退）都不過是推行新自由主義政策所產生的結果。格林斯潘和克魯格曼都是推崇自由主義的，但他們也沒有回避新自由主義帶來不良後果的現實。
就投資自由化來說，“華盛頓共識”第7條規定，要“全面開放，讓外國進入直接投資，取消各種障礙。” 這對於發展中國家來說，無異於是要自己完全敞開國門，放棄獨立自主地興辦和發展民族經濟的權利。雖然引進外資有利於吸收外國，特別是發達國家的資金和先進技術、管理經驗，但若無條件、無選擇地任由外資進入，由於發達國家一般在資金、技術和管理方面都佔有競爭優勢，發展中國家的企業就很容易被外資所控制而處於依附地位。因此，發展中國家對外資既不能一律拒之門外，又不能無條件地任其進入，而應有適度的規模和限制。
就貿易自由化來說，“華盛頓共識”第6條規定：“貿易自由化，清除非關稅壁壘，並實行低關稅率”。這實際是發達國家對發展中國家的要求，以使自己過剩的產品能搶佔發展中國家的市場。發展中國家由於自己企業的經濟技術發展水準一般比較落後，需要關稅和非關稅的保護；而發達國家憑著自己的經濟優勢，又往往實行雙重標準，對自己實行保護主義，同時又要求對手實行自由貿易政策。從經濟發展來看，幾乎沒有一個發達國家當經濟尚不發達時不實行貿易保護主義，當經濟發達以後又高唱自由貿易主義，而且即使這時自己也未排除貿易保護政策。昔日，19世紀中葉的德國經濟學家李斯特因自己祖國的經濟還比較落後，就堅決主張實行保護主義，並提出作為保護主義理論基礎的國民經濟學與英國主張的自由貿易相抗衡，就是一個落後時需要保護的典型案例。今天，發展中國家也沒有擺脫髮達國家保護主義的束縛，正如美國哈佛大學經濟學家丹尼·羅德里克在評價WTO時說：“在貿易領域，WTO已經對發展中國家強加了一系列令人生畏的義務，而且毫無疑問，每一輪新談判都將進一步勒緊腰帶。”正因為如此，WTO在1995年成立以來，國際貿易中的保護主義並未削弱，傾銷與反傾銷、保護與反保護的摩擦不是減少，反而有所增加。據統計，1995—1999年，發達國家與發展中國家的貿易摩擦立案訴訟的就有89件，佔總數的48.1%，而這一指標到2002年上升為123件，佔總數的44.5%。在這些摩擦中處於弱勢的自然是發展中國家。可見，新自由主義者所高喊的貿易自由化實際不過是企圖使發展中國家和貿易對手服從於自己貿易需要的一塊遮羞布而已。
四、對新自由主義的推行和後果的分析
以美國為首的發達國家向發展中國家推行新自由主義的手法多種多樣，無所不用其極。除了在思想理論上廣泛傳播，或者派人遊說、策劃、培訓信徒等等以外，在實際行動中還運用自己所控制的國際貨幣基金組織（IMF）、世界銀行（WB）、世界貿易組織（WTO）等國際經濟組織來推行新自由主義政策，同時還在各種“援助”的名義下來強制發展中國家接受新自由主義改革模式，以便把發展中國家統統納入自己控制的世界體系，加強對世界勞動人民的剝削。
斯蒂格利茨曾擔任世界銀行的首席經濟學家，他深知其中內情。發達國家通常是在對窮國進行援助的名義下，通過推行新自由主義來進行掠奪。而這個過程一般運用IMF、WB 、WTO等國際組織。他把這個過程劃分為四個步驟：第一步，私有化。他說，國際經濟組織要求受援國進行私有化，而推行私有化的領導人則從削價出售數以億計的國有資產中，撈取10%的回扣，中飽私囊。第二步，資本市場自由化。這是IMF、WB對窮國的“拯救計劃”，要求受援國允許資本自由流進流出，一旦投機者抽逃資金，國家的儲蓄在幾小時、幾天內就流幹了。第三步，價格市場化並引發騷亂。像1998年，IMF要求削減對窮人的食品和燃料補貼以後，印尼爆發了騷亂；玻利維亞2000年發生的水價騷亂，2001年2月厄瓜多發生的水、燃氣價格騷亂則是由世界銀行引起的。斯氏還揭露道：從世行對厄瓜多的 “轉型國家援助計劃”的秘密報告裏看出，世行就希望他們的計劃能激起“社會不安定”。一旦引起騷亂和動蕩，又引起新的資本恐慌性出逃和政府崩潰，外國公司則可以乘機以“跳樓價”買到那些價值連城的東西，比如礦山開採權或港口。第四步，自由貿易。作為一個內幕參與者，斯氏把這種自由貿易比作鴉片戰爭。他說：“與19世紀一樣，歐洲人和美國人在亞洲、非洲和拉丁美洲到處衝破壁壘打開市場，卻阻礙第三世界的農產品進入他們的市場。鴉片戰爭中，西方用戰爭來推行他們的不平等貿易。今天，世界銀行和國際貨幣基金組織使用的金融和財政手段幾乎一樣有效。”斯氏還說，把以上幾個步驟的圖景綜合起來，“我們發現：在這個體系（指資本主義世界經濟體系——引者注）中有無數人的利益受到損害，而明確無誤的贏家只有一個——西方發達國家的銀行業和美國的財政部。”因此，他最後說：“解決這個世界貧困和危機的辦法很簡單：消滅剝削者。”
斯氏作為一個資產階級經濟學家，對新自由主義如何掠奪窮國人民的過程、手法和實質竟有如此深刻、徹底的理解，如果沒有務實的精神是根本不可能的，實在難得；同時他看到，只有消滅剝削者才是解決世界窮困和危機的根本辦法，這就不僅需要有務實的精神，而且說明他已具有相當正確的理性認識和正義感了。
新自由主義自上世紀70年代興起以來，給世界經濟帶來的消極後果是十分嚴重的，西方不少學者都毫不隱諱地承認這一事實。從全世界範圍來看，新自由主義所帶來最明顯的消極後果，除前述釀成當前嚴重的國際金融危機、經濟衰退外，還促進了世界貧富懸殊的兩極分化。美國經濟學家詹姆斯·佩特拉斯認為，在我們的時代，新自由主義私有化關注的是利潤而不是生產，它僅僅導致國際壟斷資產階級在全球範圍內對現有財富和資產進行掠奪，“在任何地方都沒有導致生產力的蓬勃發展”。 拉美和歐洲的一些知識分子1997年2月在荷蘭舉行的一次會議上指出：最近20年“結構性失業嚴重，得不到保護的工人不斷增加和社會緊張形勢不斷加劇，是新自由主義造成的惡果”；“為全球的新自由主義付出的代價，不僅是造成歐洲和美國勞動力的貧困化和大量失業，而且導致大部分第三世界國家的貧困化和經常侵犯人權”。這個論點無疑是正確的，世界銀行提供的數據也支援了這個論點，世界最富國家與最窮國家人均收入差距，在新自由主義剛興起時期的1973年為44：1，到2000年擴大為727：1，即27年間貧富差距擴大了15.5倍！
以上說明，隨著經濟實踐的發展，已有愈來愈多的人認識到了新自由主義的本質和消極作用，就連有務實精神的西方學者都坦言不諱。（作者：首都經貿大學教授）
Wednesday, March 18, 2009
Consumerism critic Baudrillard dies MARCH 07, 2007
布希亞2007年3月6日病逝巴黎，葬禮於3月13日在巴黎市內的蒙帕納斯（Montparnasse）墓園舉行，哲學家何內·謝黑（René Schérer）說道：「看起來應該就是這樣，布希亞的葬禮從未發生過。更好的是，從現在起他將一直活下去。」（Tout ça est parfaitement normal, l'enterrement de Baudrillard n'a pas eu lieu et c'est tant mieux, à présent il va vivre.）
Jean Baudrillard, the French sociologist and philosopher and critic of globalisation and consumerism, has died in Paris at the age of 77.
Baudrillard died on Tuesday at his home in Paris after a long illness, said Michel Delorme, of the Galilee publishing house.
Baudrillard was a prolific writer and renowned photographer who first attracted worldwide attention in 1991 with the deliberately provocative claim that the Gulf War "did not take place".
He was one of Europe's leading postmodernist thinkers known for his provocative commentaries on consumerism.
Critic of modern society
Baudrillard argued that neither side could claim victory by the end of the war and that the conflict had changed nothing on the ground in Iraq.
Just over a decade on, in an essay entitled The Spirit of Terrorism: Requiem for the Twin Towers, he courted fresh controversy by describing the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States as an expression of "triumphant globalisation battling against itself".
Born in Rheims on July 29, 1929, into a peasant family, he studied German at the Sorbonne, later working as a teacher and translator of Bertolt Brecht before his interests turned to sociology.
Baudrillard taught sociology throughout the 1960s and went on to develop a stinging - some say nihilistic - critique of modern society.
He was the author of more than 50 works including: The Mirror of Production (1973), Simulacra and Simulation (1981), America (1986), and The Spirit of Terrorism: A Requiem for the Twin Towers (2002).
Jean Baudrillard, the French sociologist and philosopher and critic of globalisation and consumerism, has died in Paris at the age of 77.
Baudrillard died on Tuesday at his home in Paris after a long illness, said Michel Delorme, of the Galilee publishing house.
Baudrillard was a prolific writer and renowned photographer who first attracted worldwide attention in 1991 with the deliberately provocative claim that the Gulf War "did not take place".
He was one of Europe's leading postmodernist thinkers known for his provocative commentaries on consumerism.
Critic of modern society
Baudrillard argued that neither side could claim victory by the end of the war and that the conflict had changed nothing on the ground in Iraq.
Just over a decade on, in an essay entitled The Spirit of Terrorism: Requiem for the Twin Towers, he courted fresh controversy by describing the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States as an expression of "triumphant globalisation battling against itself".
Born in Rheims on July 29, 1929, into a peasant family, he studied German at the Sorbonne, later working as a teacher and translator of Bertolt Brecht before his interests turned to sociology.
Baudrillard taught sociology throughout the 1960s and went on to develop a stinging - some say nihilistic - critique of modern society.
He was the author of more than 50 works including: The Mirror of Production (1973), Simulacra and Simulation (1981), America (1986), and The Spirit of Terrorism: A Requiem for the Twin Towers (2002).
SOME LINKS WHICH MIGHT HELP YOUR STUDY OF SIMULACRA/SIMULATION
taken from here[http://www.thinkingshop.com/AIP/aesthetics/plato-baudrillard.htm]
Baudrillard:
Jean Baudrillard has written about popular culture and the emergence of imagery as reality [termed the "hyperreal"] since the mid-1970s. Here are links to some of the most interesting sites featuring the ideas of this compelling thinker.
- Baudrillard on the Web: links to many of the philosopher's essays
- Reality of Simulation: a site devoted to Baudrillard including an interview
- Directory of the Third (dis)Order --a searchable, indexed guide to key terms and concepts in the works of Jean Baudrillard.
- An interview with Baudrillard covering the time he spent in America.
- Fanfare for the Commons Utne Reader Online: Are pubic spaces in danger? Read this article to learn why the hypermarket and hypercommodity threaten the future of communities nationwide.
Studies of Virtual Reality:
- Check out these statistics on virtual worlds from Mother Jones Magazine
- the HUB explores the sociological implications of multi-user online gaming
- Sherry Turkle's MIT Initiative on Technology and Self: this project explores the ways in which our uses of technology affect the context for self-exploration and social encounters
Subscribe to:
Comments (Atom)